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CURRENT ISSUES
AIDS-A LEGAL EMERGENCY
The current outbreak of the disease known as acquired immune
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS")' is considered the most significant
epidemic since the emergence of polio and smallpox.2 Currently it
is estimated that over twelve thousand people have the AIDS vi-
rus, and it is feared that this number could double in the next two
years. s Understandably, the AIDS crisis has caused a great deal of
hysteria in our society' because of its potential for being "much
I. "Acquired" indicates that its victims did not inherit the condition. See Update on Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 Cmru¢' roa Duss CoNrto.
MostaDrry AND MORTALrrY WeaKLY Rip. 507 (Sept. 24, 1982). "Immune Deficiency" re-
flects the fact that its victims have one thing in common; they all have a severe breakdown
of their immune system. Id. at 507. The term "syndrome" covers the area of rare, fatal
diseases that take advantage of the human body's collapsed defenses. Id. at 507.
The AIDS virus crept up on the world in a surreptitious manner. See Clark, AIDS: Once
Dismissed as the Gay Plague, The Disease Has Become the No. 1 Health Menace, 56 Nzwswm
20, 21 (Aug. 12,1985).
In 1980, Dr. Michael Gottlieb of the University of California at Los Angeles identified
several men with pneumocystis carnii pneumonia (PCP), a rare type of pneumonia usually
only found in persons whose immune systems are failing, such as with kidney transplant
patients. Id. at 21. Meanwhile, Dr. Alvin Friedman-Kien of the New York University Medi-
cal Center saw one young man with Kaposi's sarcoma, an uncommon, slow developing can-
cer usually found in elderly men of Mediterranean extraction. Id. at 22. These doctors
were the first to treat persons with what later became known as acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome. Id.
2. Cf. Clark, supra note 1, at 20.
3. See Dentists Found at Small Risk to AIDS: LA Task Force, 16 A.DA Nzws, Sept. 2, 1985
at 14 [hereinafter cited as LA Task Force]; see also Bennett, Epidemiolog Update, AM.j. or
NuRSNG, Sept. 1985, at 969; Clark, supra note 1, at 20. According to Dr. William A. Ha-
zeltine of Boston's Dana Faber Cancer Institute, "once infected a person is infected for the
rest of his life." Id.
4. Set South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985). In this case the court held the respondent was not entitled to the list of
blood donors for discovery purposes in order to surmise which blood donor has AIDS. Id.
Reported accounts indicate that victims of AIDS have been faced with social censure,
embarrassment and discrimination in nearly every phase of their lives. Id. According to
Leonard Graf, the Legal Director of the National Gay Advocates in San Francisco, the
current AIDS epidemic has caused a rash of hysterical, "irrational" behavior. See
DeBenedictis, AIDS Presents Unique Challenges to Legal System, 112 NJ.LJ. 358 (1983). For
example, one woman tried to cut-off her gay ex-husband's visitation rights for fear her
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worse than anything mankind has seen before."' As well as being
a medical and public health emergency, this epidemic has spurred
new legal issues, many of which have not yet been fully explored
by the judiciary and legal commentators. This article will briefly
discuss the medical background of AIDS and then analyze, from a
constitutional perspective, proposed measures to quarantine
known AIDS victims and to bar AIDS-afflicted schoolchildren
from regular classes. Finally, this article will explore the conflict
between the state reporting statutes and the confidential relation-
ship between the doctor and patient, as it relates to AIDS.
I. HISTORICAL AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND
The medical community first identified the AIDS virus in
1981.' The prevailing theory is that the virus originated with
monkeys in Central Africa.8 AIDS spread from Africa to the Car-
ibbean and was acquired by the American tourist.' Although the
search for a cure has accelerated in the past few years, no cure has
yet been recognized. 10
children would get AIDS. Id. at 358. At a trucking company, a healthy, gay staff member
was made to use the bathroom outside on the loading dock. Id. In California, a healthy
man was fired from his job, when his medical records were leaked and they incorrectly
stated he had AIDS. See Comment, AIDS-A Legal Epidemic, 17 AKRON L. REv. 717, 735
(1984). As a result, his house was burned down by vandals. Id. at 735. In New York, parents
of a dying teenager refused a blood transfusion, for fear the patient might contract AIDS.
Newsday, Nov. 21, 1985, at 40, col. i.
5. Clark, supra note 1, at 20.
6. See Reaves, AIDS and the Law, 69 A.BAJ. 1014 (1983). For instance, human rights
agencies in California and New York have received numerous complaints from homosexu-
als alleging employment discrimination as a result of their fear of AIDS. See Comment,
supra note 4, at 735. In Shuttleworth v. Broward County, a former analyst for the county
budget office was fired after it was revealed the plaintiff had AIDS. See Tarr, AIDS Victims
Face Bias Tao, 7 NAT'. U. 30 (1985). Another legal issue yet to be resolved is whether
insurance companies may refuse to pay for AIDS medical treatment since it is still consid-
ered experimental. See Reaves, supra, at 1014. In California, AIDS victims have brought
suit against the state for refusing to meet Medi-Cal payments for AIDS treatment. See
Comment, supra note 4, at 733. The American Civil Liberties Union's attorneys came
within one day of suing the Air Force for discharging an enlisted man afflicted with AIDS.
See DeBenedictis, supra note 4, at 358. Upon review by a superior review board the airman
was granted temporary retirement with full medical benefits. Id.
7. See Clark, supra note 1, at 20.
8. See id. at 20.
9. See id. at 23.
10. See id. at 26. The search for drugs to treat AIDS is accelerating rapidly; in the last
year more than one hundred potential compounds have been screened. Ild. Researchers are
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The AIDS virus, medically labeled human T-cells lymphotropic
virus III (HTLV-III), attacks a subgroup of white blood cells,
known as the T-4 lymphocytes, which play a major role in defend-
ing the body against infections.11 The virus enters T-cells and in-
corporates into the nucleus, and reproduces, thereby killing the
T-cells." A gene in the virus creates a protein which takes over
the infected T-cell, and new viruses are produced at an acceler-
ated pace.' This creates a cellual immunodeficiency, rendering
the body defenseless to a vast array of secondary illnesses.1 4
At present, AIDS is known to be transmitted through sexual
activity which involves the exchange of bodily fluids, infusions of
contaminated blood and by injections with infected hypodermic
needles." The pathogenesis of the AIDS disease remains a mys-
testing new drugs such as suramin, ribavirin and HPA 23 with the hope that they suppress
the virus that causes AIDS. See LA Task Force, supra note 3, at 14.
HPA 23 was the drug used to treat Rock Hudson at the Pasteur Institute in Paris. See
Clark, supra note 1, at 26. This drug has been rejected because of its toxic nature. Id.
Suramin, which is currently being tested by American researchers, is designed to prevent
the AIDS virus from entering healthy cells. Id.
A vaccine would be the ideal way to overcome the AIDS epidemic, but it probably will
not be available in the near future. Id. Vaccinations against viruses are generally made
from the protein antigens on the surface of the organism and it is these antigens that set
off production of antibodies. Id. at 27. The problem with the AIDS virus is that unlike
most viruses it is prone to mutation, hence its antigens keep changing. Id. The mutability
of this virus renders conventional vaccinations useless. Id.
I1. See Clark, supra note 1, at 22.
12. Id.
13. Ld.
14. Sn Comment, supra note 4, at 723. As a result of this dysfunction the body be-
comes a defenseless host to an array of infections or rare cancers, notably a previously
exotic malignancy known as Kaposis sarcoma. See LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697.
700, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 305 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1983). Kaposis sarcoma has sur-
faced in thirty percent of all AIDS cases. Id. Meanwhile, a variety of pneumonias have
appeared in fifty percent of all AIDS cases. Id.
AIDS has a broad range of symptoms such as: swollen glands, fatigue, malaise, fever,
night sweats, diarrhea and a gradual loss of weight. See Clark, supra note 1, at 24. In addi-
tion, the virus sometimes invades brain cells, causing some victims to suffer from mental
and neurological problems such as forgetfulness, impaired speech, tremors and seizures,
progressing to dementia. Id. at 24.
15. See Comment, supra note 4, at 724. The cause of AIDS is essentially unknown, but
the established forms of transmission are through sexual contact (especially anal inter-
course), contaminated needles and by the percutaneous inoculation of infected blood or
blood products. Id. The virus can be transmitted through semen. See Clark, supra note 1, at
24. According to Walter Bond, M.S., a microbiologist with the CDC's Hospital Infections
Program, AIDS can be "vertically transmitted from an infected mother to a child in
utero." See LA Task Forme, supra note 3, at 15. Finally, the virus has been found in saliva,
but there is no proof yet that links saliva exchange with transmission. Id.
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tery to the medical community, causing speculation and fear with
every new case.1
Since 1979, over 12,000 cases of AIDS have been reported to
the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia. 7 Ac-
cording to CDC figures, approximately 6,170 people have died
from AIDS thus far, and it is estimated that AIDS-related deaths
will double in the next twelve to fourteen months.la Nearly sev-
enty-five percent of AIDS victims are homosexual or bisexual, five
percent are hemophiliacs, seventeen percent are intravenous drug
users, and the remainder of the victims have no known cause of
origin.1 '
The known modes of transmission are substantiated by the category of people suffering
from AIDS. See Comment, supra note 4, at 724. AIDS transmissability by sexual inter-
course accounts for the high incidence of AIDS amongst homosexuals. Id. Its pathogenesis
through contaminated needles answers for the high rate of AIDS amongst drug users. Id.
Finally, its transmission through contaminated blood accounts for the high incidence of
AIDS in hemophiliacs and recipients of blood transfusions. Id.
16. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 702, 467 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306-07 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1983) (testimony of Dr. John P. Hanrahan, Internal Medicine Specialist
and Epidemiologist at the CDC).
17. See LA Task Force, supra note 3, at 14.
18. Id.
19. See LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 701, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 306 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1983). In addition, European countries have also been afflicted. See Clark,
supra note 1, at 23. Thus far, approximately three hundred cases have been reported in
France, one hundred sixty-two in West Germany, and one hundred eighty-four in Great
Britain. Id. Also, over five hundred case have been reported in Haiti. Id. According to
CDC figures since 1979, the following chart represents the impact of AIDS by states:
STATE CASES DEATHS
New York 4,388 2,274
California 2,799 1.205
Florida 866 437
New Jersey 751 465
Texas 622 330
Illinois 255 137
Id. at 14. Ninety percent of AIDS victims are between the ages of twenty and forty-nine,
and the majority of the victims are residents of large cities such as New York, San Fran-
cisco and Los Angeles. Comment, supra note 4, at 720. Over forty-five percent of all AIDS
victims reside in New York, four times greater than San Francisco, the city with the next
highest amount. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 701, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 306
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1983).
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II. QUARANTINE OF KNOWN AIDS VICTIMS- A PuBLIc HEALTH
MEASURE
In the United States, public health measures have been assumed
by both the federal and state governments."0 Although the United
States Constitution makes no mention of health care jurisdiction,
states traditionally have handled these matters under the auspices
of their police powers.21 Under the states' police power the gov-
20: See G. McKAY & J. McKRAY, Federal Health Laws in the United Staies in LwAL As-
pwcrs oy HEALTH Poucy-Issurs AND TRENns 33 (R. Roemer & G. McKray 1980). The
United States Government has the power "[tjo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. As
a response to the augmented demands of an increasingly complex society, the federal gov-
ernment has taken a far more active role in the field of public health. See K WiNG, THE
LAW AND THE PUC HEALTH 17 (1976). The federal government has increased Commerce
Clause power to regulate goods after they have passed through interstate commerce, as
well as activities that are only indirectly related to people or goods that have previously
passed through state borders. Id.
For example, Congress has often used the Commerce Clause as a basis for passing direct
regulations in the field of public health. See Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government
in Protecting Citizensfrom Communicable Diseases, 47 U. C. L Rxv. 537, 545 n.61 (1978).
Federal regulation of foods, drugs, meat, poultry, and biologic products have all been
based on the powers deriving from the Commerce Clause. Id. at 545 n.61.
The Constitution reads: "[t]he Congress shall have the power to lay and collect Taxes."
US. CONsT. art.l, § 8, cl.l. The courts have interpreted the federal constitutional power to
lay and collect taxes as including the power to control and regulate whatever federal tax
revenues are spent for. See Morgenstern, supra at 545. Congress uses the states to effectu-
ate federal policies. Id. The federal government provides funds for a state program, and as
a condition to obtain the federal funds, the state must adopt the federal standards. Id. For
example, the CDC issues standards for the establishment of vaccination programs. Id. at
545 n.62. If the state adheres to the federal standards, the CDC will then administer the
funds to the state. Id. at 545 n.62.
Federal programs using these so-called "grants-in aids" fill a myriad of societal needs. See
GRAD, Puauc HEALTH LAW MANuAL 22 (st ed. 2d printing 1970). For instance, slum clear-
ance, urban renewal, medical assistance for senior citizens, maternal and child welfare,
mental health needs and a vast array of research and training programs have all been effec-
tuated by the federal government through grants-in-aids. Id. In order for a state to obtain
federal funds, it must prove to the appropriate agency that it will adopt the federal stan-
dards. Id.
In addition, the U.S. Surgeon General, a federal agency, is authorized, upon the request
of any health authority, to send for any person within the jurisdiction of such authority
who is afflicted with leprosy and to convey such person to the appropriate hospital for
detention and treatment. See 42 U.S.C. § 247(e) (1982).
21. Set Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (quarantine valid exercise of po-
lice power); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470-71 (1877) (police powers extend to
promotion of health and safety); Barsky v. State Univ. of New York Bd. of Regents, 347
U.S. 442 (1953) (power of a state to establish and enforce standards of conduct relative to
health is a vital part of police power); see also K WinG, supra note 20, at 17. The tenth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: "Itihe powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
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ernment may interfere whenever public interest demands." It is
within the states' domain to determine what measures are neces-
sary to protect the public; and it is inevitable that individual rights
will be infringed upon for the sake of the general welfare.28 In
respectively, or to the people." US. CoNsT. amend. X.
Since the federal government may only act where they have explicit powers, the state
governments have broad inherent powers to act in areas where the federal government
may not. See K. WING, supra note 20, at 17. Under the American legal system the state
governments may exercise all powers traditionally inherent in government itself. Id. The
major constraints on the states' sweeping powers are: "(1) the powers explicitly delegated
to the federal government or prohibited to the states and (2) individual rights enumerated
in state and federal constitutions." Id. at 17-18.
One state power implied in our legal system is known as police powers, a term defined by
courts as reasonable regulations which are necessary to preserve the public order, health,
safety and welfare. Id. at 18. The Supreme Court has defined police power as:
[t]he authority of a state to enact quarantine laws and 'health laws of every descrip-
tion'; indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory ... Ac-
cording to settled principles the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at
least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will
protect the public health and the public safety.(citation omitted).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1, 25 (1905).
The states' police power was the basis for. (1) the passage of water fluoridation laws; see
Note, Consitutional Law-Due Procen-Flouri4a ion of Water, 38 NoTmz DAME LAW. 71, 71
(1962); (2) the regulation of the medical profession; see Erlanger v. Regents of the Univ. of
the State of New York, 256 App. Div. 444, 10 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (3rd Dep't 1939); (3) restrict-
ing the use of municipal disposal sites; see Leimpeter's Disposal Service, Inc. v. Mayor
Council of the Borough of Carteret, 121 N.J. Super. 18, 21, 295 A.2d 411, 414 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1972); and (4) the regulation of massage parlors. Cianciolo v. Members of City
Council, 376 F. Supp. 719, 720 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
22. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). Courts have stressed the greatest
asset our society possesses is our vast human resource. See People ex tel Barmore v. Robert-
son, 302 Iii. 422, 134 N.E. 815, 817 (1922). justice Brown succinctly stated in the Lawton
opinion:
[T]he State may interfere whenever the public interest demands it, and in this par-
ticular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for
the protection of such interests.(citations omitted). To justify the State in thus inter-
posing its authority in behalf of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasona-
bly necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
23. See Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267, 269-70 (1943). Health measures
may infringe upon constitutional rights when deemed reasonable. For example, such regu-
lations may place limitations on the right to privacy where the individual and public health
is involved. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973). Police powers in the sphere of
public health measures may even infringe upon first amendments rights. See In re Gregory,
85 Misc. 2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Family Ct. Kings County 1976). In this case, the re-
spondent's child suffered from several medical ailments which could easily be relieved. Id.
at 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 621. The respondent contended that she was a member of the
Church of God and Christ, and it is her religious belief God and Jesus will help her chil-
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order to justify such an infringement, any health measure must
bear at least a rational relationship to its intended purpose" or
the courts will declare such measure unconstitutional.' The AIDS
crisis has created a whirlwind of proposed health measures, the
constitutional validity of which has not yet been decided by the
judiciary.2s In California, the State Department of Health " out-
lined a policy whereby a local health department may quarantine
dren and accordingly refused to take her child for medical treatment. See id. at 847-48, 380
N.Y.S.2d at 621. The court held that freedom of religion does not justify practices which
are inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. See id. at 847-48, 380 N.Y.S.2d at
621-22.
24. See Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Il1. 2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S 964 (1965). It is a settled concept of law that a police measure, to be
beyond the pale of constitutional infirmity, must bear a rational relation to the public
health. 198 N.E. 2d at 329. "Reasonable" regulation under a state's police power implies
the regulation rests on adequate reason, and thus may not be arbitrary. Note, Health Care
Reulations In California: C.O.N.stitutional? 1I PAC. L.J. 845, 854 (1980). If a health regula-
tion's objective is within the state's regulatory power, its provisions then must have a real
and substantial relation to that objective. Id. at 854. The constitutionality of police mea-
sures are determined by: (1) analyzing the regulation's purposes and; (2) ascertaining
whether the regulation is related in a reasonable fashion to those purposes. Id. at 854.
25. See Lawton v. Steele, 197 U.S. 133. 136 (1894). For example, a statute which pro-
hibited the transport of certain cattle into Missouri between specified dates in each year
was held to be in violation of the Commerce Clause, and not a legitimate exercise of the
state's police powers, even though the law was designed to prevent the spread of conta-
gious diseases. See Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 468 (1877). Also, a health
statute in New York which authorized the seizure and sale of all trespassing animals was
held to be a deprivation of an individual's property without due process of law. See
Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N.Y. 302, 309-10 (1866).
26. Cf. D. Langer, INTRODUCTION IN AIDS LEGAL GuI- A PROFESSIONAL RzsouRcx ON
AIDS-RzLT.D LEGAL Issuits AND DISCiIMINATION I (lst ed. 1984).
27. A state legislature very often does not directly exercise all public health measures
themselves. See FLEISHER, The Law of Basic Public Health Activities: Police Power and Consitu-
tional Limitations in LEGAL AsPEcrs oy HEALTH Poucy-Issuss AND Tris 9 (R. Roemer &
G. McKray ed. 1980). Usually, a state legislature delegates its authority to an administrative
agency, as in the case in California, and a local government. Id. The most common delega-
tion in the public health area is when a state legislature authorizes a local board of health
to implement a law that it passes. Id. For example, a legislature may pass a law, then grant
local authorities certain powers in order to implement the law. Id. A common example of
this is the inspection of restaurants. Id.
This delegation of power by the states to local authorities does have certain limitations.
Id. First, these laws generally or specifically outline limits within which the designee can
act, hence any delegation in excess thereof is invalid. Id. Furthermore, regulations must be
enacted in a proper manner. Id.
All reasonable presumptions should be made in favor of a public health measure by the
court. See Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267, 269 (1943). Notwithstanding the
court's strict construction of quarantine statutes, courts must allow latitude for the reasona-
ble discretion of the authorities upon the facts of the case. See Comment, inf a note 28, at
336. Broad discretion is given to the legislature in developing a suitable response to an
epidemic. See id.
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 1: 1, 1985
known AIDS victims." This proposed quarantine would only be a
last resort after a four-prong approach has been exhausted."
A. The California Approach
When the California Health Department conclusively deter-
mines an individual has AIDS, he is personally contacted by a lo-
cal health department staff member who requests that he follow
certain recommendations to reduce risk of transfer." If the pa-
tient denies he has AIDS, the local health department may refer
the patient to an AIDS support group."1 If the patient refuses to
adhere to these recommendations, then the local health depart-
ment will issue orders for modified isolation.8 These orders will
outline quarantine procedures which will be taken if he or she is
28. Pagano, Quarantine Considered for AIDS Victims, 4 CAL LAW. 17, 17 (1984). The
California Department of Health Services, Infectious Disease Section, has proposed the
following measures in response to a documented recalcitrant AIDS patient:
If it can be documented that failure on the part of the AIDS patient to follow rec-
ommendations given to him by the health department will result in significant expo-
sure of sexual contacts (who are not aware he has AIDS) to AIDS, then we recom-
mend the following action be taken:
(1) Personal contact by local health department staff be carried out to specifically
inform the patient in word and print of the need to adhere to public health recom-
mendations such as abstaining from sexual activities which could transmit a possible
AIDS agent to sexual contacts who are unaware that he had AIDS.
(2) If the patient either denies that he has AIDS or is openly hostile and refuses to
adhere to medical recommendations, the local health department may refer the pa-
tient to an AIDS support group and request the support group to contact and coun-
sel the patient.
(3) If the patient still denies that he has AIDS and/or refuses to adhere to recom-
mendations, then the local health department will issue orders for his modified isola-
tion. Such orders will detail the need to adhere to public health recommendations
and also outline quarantine procedures which will be taken if he is found to be in
violation of the orders.
(4) If the patient ignores the modified isolation orders, then the local health depart-
ment will quarantine the patient's residence by posting a placard at his residence
which indicates that a person with a communicable disease which can be transmitted
by intimate contact resides in the household.
See Comment, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality, I I J. CoierxMp. LAW 315, 340-
41 (1984) (Appendix) (citing Memorandum to Ramon Perez, Office of Legal Services, Sac-
ramento. from Dr. James Chin, M.D., Chief Infectious Disease Section Department of
Health Services).
29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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found to be in violation of the orders." Finally, if the modified
isolation orders are ignored, then local health officials will quaran-
tine the patient in his residence by posting a sign there which indi-
cates that "a person with a communicable disease which can be
transmitted by intimate contact resides in the household."" It is
suggested that the California quarantine proposal is a proper ex-
ercise of the state's police power, and does not violate the victim's
due process or equal protection rights under the fourteenth
amendment.
The fourteenth amendment affords an individual two types of
due process: (1) substantive due process, and (2) procedural due
process." Substantive due process requires that the state action
have a rational relationship to a legitimate government end" or
the legislation will be struck down as an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of an individual's right to liberty.' 7
B. Substantive Due Process
In light of the high fatality rate of AIDS victims and medical
uncertainty as to its pathogenesis, it is suggested, a quarantine
33. Set id.
34. Se id.
35. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CoNsrrtmoNAL LAw 42 (2d ed. 1983). The
fourteenth amendment effectively provides protections to citizens from its own state gov-
ernment. See Grad, supra note 20, at 28.
The Supreme Court has refused to state a rigid definition of due process of law, but it
clearly encompasses all of the procedural and substantive legal protections traditionally en-
joyed in this country. Id. at 31; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). Due
process is a vague notion, but would probably include any state action that is a clear abuse
or arbitrary exercise of power. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
The Due Process Clause focuses on the treatment accorded to an individual person.
Grad, supra note 20, at 30. This clause insures that no person shall be deprived of those
rights which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and guarantees decent and fair
treatment under the law. See Rochn 342 U.S. at 169. Justice Frankfurter in Rochin stated:
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave the judges at large. We
may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits
that bind judges in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due process
of law is not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are
fused in the whole nature of our judicial processes. These are considerations deeply
rooted in reason and in the compelling tradition of the legal profession.
See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169-70 (citation omitted).
36. See J. NowAx. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 35, at 443.
37. See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 22-23 (9th Cir. 1900) (court struck down
quarantine since it was overbroad); In re Smith, 146 N.Y. 68, 40 N.E. 497 (1885) (court
invalidated the quarantine of the petitioner who was afflicted with smallpox).
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would have a rational relationship to the legitimate government
concern of protecting the public's health. It is well established
that public health is a prime concern of the state, and an individ-
ual's personal liberties may validly be infringed upon for the pub-
lic good." Indeed the quarantines of individuals with dangerous
diseases such as venereal disease and smallpox have been premised
on this line of reasoning." Moreover, the state need not wait for a
widespread outbreak of the disease before acting;40 public health
measures may be preventative by design.'1 Although the state may
infringe upon personal liberties, in such a situation a quarantine
must be reasonable in light of the risk involved."4 Currently, med-
ical evidence indicates that AIDS can only be spread through inti-
mate sexual contact, and the use of infected hypodermic needles,
and not casual contact.48 However, it should be noted that at this
38. See infa note 57 and accompanying text.
39. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (compulsory vaccination for
smallpox is a valid health measure); see also, Barmore v. Robertson, 302 III. 422, 134 N.E.
815, 817 (1922) (a carrier of typhoid may be quarantined); Ex pare Caselli, 62 Mont. 201,
204 P. 364 (1922) (quarantine of a person suspected of having venereal disease upheld).
40. See Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quarantine is a pre-
ventive measure); Board of Educ. of Mountain Lakes v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 261, 152
A.2d 394, 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (school may require vaccines as a means of
preventing spread of disease). In Mas, the Board of Education required smallpox vaccina-
tions of all schoolchildren, notwithstanding the fact that there had been no local cases of
smallpox for nearly a decade. 56 N.J. Super. at 267, 152 A.2d at 405. The court stated:
The absence of an existing emergency does not warrant a denial to the regulative
agency of the exercise of preventive means. A local board of education need not
await an epidemic, or even a single sickness or death, before it decides upon action
to protect the public. To hold otherwise would be to destroy prevention as means of
combatting the spread of disease.
Id. at 405.
41. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. at 819. The Barmore court stated:
One of the most important elements in the administration of health and quarantine
regulations is a full measure of common sense. It is not necessary for the health
authorities to wait until the person affected with a contagious disease has actually
caused others to become sick by contact with him, before he is placed under
quarantine.
Id. at 820.
42. See, e.g., Swift and Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216 (1942) (commissioner may
prescribe reasonable quarantine measures in light of the factual circumstances); Clasan v.
Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 443 (1939) (statute held unreasonable quarantine, since risk did not
warrant such measures); see also Damme, Controlling Genetic Diseases Through Law, 15 U.C.D.
L. REv. 801, 810 (1982). Courts must look closely at the factual circumstances surrounding
the epidemic, such as investigating who has the disease, who is a carrier and what geo-
graphic area is susceptible to the disease in question. Id. at 810.
43. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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time over five percent of AIDS victims have no known cause of
origin," and the fatality rate of AIDS victims is a staggering fifty
percent. 8 Therefore, it is submitted, that any attempt to halt the
spread of this deadly disease is reasonable.
C. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process simply guarantees that the decision
making process is fair, i.e., the individual is given adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard, before the state infringes upon a
person's right to life, liberty or property." It is submitted that the
California proposal would afford an individual procedural due
process. The proposed quarantine is only triggered after it is es-
tablished that the individual has AIDS.' 7 Thereafter, the individ-
ual is given oral and written notice of recommendations, an op-
portunity for counseling, and a notice of modified isolation." In
addition, it is evident that the victim is given the opportunity to
legally contest the threatened quarantine early on."
D. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment lim-
its state actions when they classify certain individuals to shoulder
more of a burden than others." If the state action affects a sus-
pect classification" or infringes upon a fundamental personal
44. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 969 n.2.
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1978); see also J. NOWAK, k.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 35, at 527.
47. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Courts have held that deprivation of lib-
erty in the realm of public health measures may only be made after due inquiry and such
inquiry must include notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C.
372, 65 S.. 387, 390 (1909). In the case of an emergency, however, the state may act
without a hearing in order to remedy the peril as rapidly as possible. See Lowe v. Conroy,
120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942, 944 (1904). In addition, in public health, a formal hearing is
not always required when it is apparent that the individual has not tendered any evidence
questioning the validity of the measure. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning,
412 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1972).
49. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
50. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1960); See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77
(1922); Grad, supra note 20 at 29.
51. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 299 (1976) (inherently suspect
classifications include race, religion or alienage); Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250,
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right" the action will be subject to "strict scrutiny" by the judici-
ary." Under the strict scrutiny test, the state must prove that the
classification promotes a compelling state interest." On the other
hand, if the action does not affect a fundamental right or include
a suspect class, the state need only prove that the measure is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose.'5 Since the
California proposal would infringe upon the personal liberties of
certain individuals, it must be analyzed from a strict scrutiny per-
spective." It is suggested that under a strict judicial review the
proposed quarantine would be upheld. The compelling state inter-
est is the promotion of public health.'7 The state has an interest in
475 N.E. 2d 95, 98 (1984) (age is not a suspect classification); see also J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 35, at 448 (suspect classification is one that is based on the
traits of race, national origin, or status as a resident alien).
52. Fundamental rights are those which courts recognize as having a value which is
essential to individual liberty. See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 35, at 457.
This right has no textual basis in the Constitution. Id. For example, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), the majority opinion found a "fundamental right to
privacy" in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. The right to vote is fundamental. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). Right to travel is a fundamental right. McCoy-Elk-
horn Coal v. E.P.A., 622 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir. 1980).
53. Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents v. Texas,
448 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1980). The Supreme Court held that a statute is violative of the
Equal Protection Clause if it infringes upon a fundamental right, but is not justified by a
compelling state interest. Id.
54. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute allowing illegitimate distributee
estate assets strictly scrutinized); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 415 (1981) (if a court may
construe a less restrictive means to serve same legitimate government purpose, overbroad
statute is invalid); see also Comment, supra note 28, at 323-24.
55. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (right to educa-
tion held not fundamental, so state must show a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (states discretion to levy taxes
not subject to strict judicial scrutiny unless oppressive or discriminatory); Richardson v.
Secretary of Labor, 689 F.2d 632, 633 (6th Cir.), cerit denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1982) (unless a
classification trammels fundamental rights or suspect classifications, the state measure need
only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
56. Ste Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959) (where there is an infringement
on personal liberty, state may prevail only upon a showing of a compelling interest); Seide
v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (where personal liberty is involved,
strict scrutiny is required by the Equal Protection Clause); McCoy-Elkhorn Coal v. E.P.A.,
622 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir. 1980) (strict scrutiny not appropriate for the right to travel
even though it is a personal liberty interest); Comment, supra note 28, at 323-24.
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (state interest in safeguarding pregnant
mother's health becomes compelling at a certain point in pregnancy); Forest Hills Early
Learning Center v. Lukhard, 728 F.2d 230, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1984) (a substantial threat to
the public health is a compelling state interest); Florida Women's Med. Clinic v. Smith, 536
F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (fundamental right of privacy must be weighed
against compelling state interest in protecting public health).
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reducing the spread of AIDS to protect the public, and any pre-
ventive measure promoting this goal is necessary and valid."
III. BARRING SCHOOLCHILDREN WITH AIDS FROM REGULAR
CLASSES
Currently, a great controversy is stirring throughout the coun-
try concerning the presence of AIDS infected children in regular
classes.5' As a response, the National Education Association (NEA)
issued a policy statement urging school districts to bar AIDS-af-
flicted schoolchildren from regular classes." The NEA recom-
mends that this decision should be made on a case by case basis,
by a team that includes the child's parents, medical and school
personnel. 1 "Every reasonable effort" would be made to provide
alternative instruction for AIDS-infected children barred from
regular classes." This arrangement strikes a balance between the
right of the AIDS victim to an education" and the right of
healthy teachers and students to be free from exposure to this fa-
tal disease."
An individual is only afforded the protection of the fourteenth
58. See, e.g., Ex parte McGee, .105 Kan. 574, 185 P. 14, 15 (1919) (state interest in
reducing spread of venereal disease rendered a quarantine valid); Board of Health of Cov-
ington v. Kollman, 156 Ky. 351, 160 S.W. 1052, 1054 (1913) (state has power to pass
bottling ordinances to prevent spread of disease from milk); Birchard v. Board of Health,
204 Mich. 284, 169 N.W. 901, 902 (1918) (state has power to take measures to prevent the
entrance of pestilential disease into a city).
59. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 6. A case is being heard in the New
York State Supreme Court, Queens County, before Justice Harold Hyman. Id. In this suit,
School District 27 of Ozone Park sued to bar a second grade pupil with AIDS from regular
classes until the child's identity was disclosed. Id. In New Jersey, a five-year old girl in
Plainfield, who suffers from AIDS is being kept out of kindergarten, and in Washington
Borough, N.J., a boy with AIDS and his exposed sister have been banned from school. Sea
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at B5, col. 1.
60. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at A25, col. 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (where a state has
undertaken to provide education, it must be made available to all on equal terms); New
York State Ass'n v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (free appropriate educa-
tion must be offered to all children within its geographic boundaries); Kruse v. Campbell,
431 F. Supp. 180, 188 (E.i. Va. 1977) (exclusion of a class of persons from public sup-
ported education is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
64. Cf. Hagler v. Lamer, 284 111. 547, 120 N.E. 575, 578 (1918) (the right to enjoy
school and other privileges may be exercised in an environment free of exposure to deadlydiseases).
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amendment when he is deprived of life, liberty or property at the
hand of the state." It is suggested that any state action modeled
after the NEA proposal would be constitutional since alternative
means of education would be provided." Even under a constitu-
tional analysis, this proposal does not violate the student's right to
equal protection, procedural due process or substantive due
process.
As in the case of quarantine, this measure would not constitute
an equal protection violation because it promotes the state's com-
pelling interest in public health. 7 Both the parents of the victims
and professionals are actively involved in the decision-making pro-
cess and only known AIDS victims are affected." In light of the
extensive opportunity to be heard and ample notice to the par-
ents, it is suggested procedural due process requirements are
met.6 Finally, the NEA recommendations do not violate substan-
tive due process rights, since this measure is reasonable under the
circumstances, and it could prevent further spread of the AIDS
virus.7 0 The New York Court of Appeals in Viemeister v. White
65. Set'J. NOWAK, IL ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, supra note 35, at 488; GEM, SPERRY. EDUCA-
TION LAW AND THE PuBuc ScooLs A CoMPENDIUm D-52 (lst ed. 1978).
66. See, e.g., In re Handicapped Child, 20 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 69, 70 (1980) (school dis-
trict obliged to provide suitable educational opportunities for handicapped students who
cannot attend ordinary classes); In re Handicapped Child, 20 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 172, 174
(1980) (responsible to provide suitable opportunities, not the best possible program); In re
Handicapped Child, 20 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 694, 696 (1981) (school district responsible to
provide handicapped child with an appropriate educational program).
67. Set supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at 25, col. 1. The NEA proposal closely resembles
the procedures used when a handicapped child is placed in special classes. See N.Y. EDUC
LAW § 4402 (Consol. 1976). Underthis statutory scheme, the decision as to placement of
the child is made by a committee consisting of a school psychologist, physician, administra-
tor and a parent of the child. N.Y. EDuc_ LAw § 4402 (bXl) (Consol. 1976).
69. Se, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1978) (respondents'
dismissal from medical school comported with due process requirements since she was
given notice and had an opportunity to be heard); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448,
450 (5th Cir. 1976) (school's dismissal of student on academic grounds without a hearing
did not violate due process); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850-51 (10th Cir. 1975)
(student's expulsion did not violate due process because she was aware of the failure to
meet school standards). See GE. SPERRY, supra note 65, at D-51. Procedural due process
requires every student receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before being denied
enrollment in regular classes. Id. at D-52. It provides a safeguard to protect students from
arbitrary and capricious acts by school authorities or other government authorities. Id.
70. Cf. Hagler v. Lamer, 284 Ill. 547, 120 N.E. 575, 578 (1918); see also GEE, SPERRY,
supra note 65, at D-51. Substantive due process, in relation to public schools, requires the
school's administration to demonstrate the denial to the student of their right to life, lib-
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stated that schoolchildren may be barred from regular classes
when they contract a disease that is both "dangerous and conta-
gious"."' AIDS, which has a fifty percent fatality rate, no known
cure, and a minimal chance of recovery, can certainly be deemed
"dangerous". 7 ' Furthermore, the Viemeister court's use of the
word "contagious" is apparently based on the fear of possible
transmission of the disease. 7" Since the medical community has
not yet uncovered all of the methods by which AIDS may be
transferred, the AIDS virus could possibly be transmitted in the
school environment and therefore would fall into the Viemeister
erty or property. Id. School officials may administer actions which impinge upon constitu-
tionally protected interests only if such actions have a valid relationship to the improve-
ment of the educational system. Id. The determination of what measures are valid is made
by the legislature, as well as the state and local school boards. Id.
71. See Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904). There is a long line of
case law and statutory authority which conditions school attendance on health require-
ments. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Mountain Lakes v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d
394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (policy of a local school board requiring vaccination
against smallpox and immunization to diphtheria as a prerequisite for public school attend-
ance within the ambit of the delegated legislative authority); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174,
176 (1922) (municipal ordinance requiring vaccination certificate as a condition to public
school attendance held valid); see also Morgenstern, supra note 20, at 545 n.62.
The states began in the nineteenth century to exercise their police power by requiring
vaccinations as a prerequisite for school attendance. Id. The trend in state legislature prac-
tices has been to compel vaccinations for certain infectious diseases. Id. For example, be-
tween 1961 and 1968 twenty states enacted legislation which made polio immunization a
mandatory prerequisite for school attendance. Id. According to New York State law:
In the event that a person in parental relation to a child makes an application for
admission of such child to a school or as a child attending school and there exists no
certificate or other acceptable evidence of the child's immunization against poliomy-
elitis, mumps, measles, diphtheria, and rubella, the principal, teacher, owner or per-
son in charge of the school shall inform such person of the necessity to have the
child immunized ...
N.Y. Pu& HEALTH LAW § 2164 (Consol. 1976 & Supp. 1984).
In a legislative statement, the New York State Legislature declared that the large num-
ber of unprotected pre-school children must be immunized to protect their own self-inter-
est, as well as for the health of the community at large. Se N.Y. Pu& HEALTH LAW § 2164
history (Consol. 1976). Therefore, such children must be immunized before they attend
school. ld.
72. Cf. Clark, supra note, I at 21; see also Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Works, 145
Cal. 207, 78 P. 654, 655 (1904) (angina pectoris deemed a "dangerous disease"); Christ v.
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 312 III. 525, 144 N.E. 161, 163 (1924) (a dangerous disease is
one which causes great and lasting injury); City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109
Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303, 304 (1918) (smallpox deemed a dangerous disease).
73. See Vienmgster, 179 N.Y. at 238. The Court of Appeals specifically outlined several
diseases in their opinion which are of a highly contagious character. Id. Therefore, in or-
der to prevent further spread of these diseases, the vaccination was required as a condition
precedent to school attendance. Id.
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notion of "contagious". 4 Therefore, it is suggested, that in light
of the Viemeister decision, the NEA proposal would be upheld by
the courts as a reasonable measure in light of the risks involved.
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE STATE REPORTING STATUTES
While state dealings with the AIDS epidemic may be effectuated
through quarantine measures and special AIDS classrooms, such
measures hinge on the state's ability to identify those afflicted with
AIDS. 75 Therefore, state reporting statutes which impose a duty
on doctors and other health care professionals to report AIDS vic-
tims to the appropriate health officials should be effectuated, even
though this would effectively vitiate the doctor/patient confiden-
tial relationship.' 6 Doctors and other medical professionals who
come into personal contact with the most intimate personal infor-
mation about their patients have a legal duty not to reveal this
information.7' The theory is that confidentiality allows the medi-
cal professional to procure facts which aid in the treatment of the
patient.78 Since the patient is often in a vulnerable position if this
74. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 689. AIDS can be spread in a manner similar to hepa-
titis B. Id. In New York City, an administrative agency recommended that retarded school-
children with hepatitis B be placed in separate classes due to fear of the spread of this
disease. See New York State Ass'n for the Retarded v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 493
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
75. Cf Gellman, Prescribing Policy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of
Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REv. 255, 274 (1984); see N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 24.1 (1983);
According to the New York State Sanitary Code: "[ajll cases or suspected cases of Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome shall be reported to the Commissioner of Health, by
city, county and district health officers, physicians, hospital administrators, laboratories or
persons in charge of State institutions." Id. This measure was passed as an emergency mea-
sure in June 1983, and was made permanent in October 1983. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10
§ 24.1 (1985).
76. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 24.1 (1983).
77. See Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So.2d 824. 829-30 (1974) (medical doctor
under general duty not to disclose patient data); Cannell v. Medical & Surgical Clinic, 315
N.E.2d 278, 280 (III. 1974) (physician's responsibility to protect the patients medical
records results from the confidential nature of this relationship); Smith v. Driscoll, 62 P.
572, 572 (Wash. 1917) (physician breach of the doctor/patient confidential relationship
provides patient with a remedy at law); see also Gellman supra note 75 at 271. In addition, a
doctor when taking the Hippocratic oath ethically binds himself or herself to keep patients'
records confidential. Id. at 267.
78. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings [Doe], 56 N.Y.2d 348, 352, 437 N.E.2d 1118,
1123 (1983), 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 366; see also Winslade, Confidentiality of Medical Records-An
Overview of Concepts and Legal Policies, 3 J. LEGAL Mw. 497, 503 (1982) (purpose of confi-
dentiality to promote patient trust and to facilitate truthful and complete disclosure of
AIDS
sensitive information is transferred, he is more likely to speak
openly if the transfer is confidential." Therefore, in general, the
data on a patient's chart is confidential and cannot be disclosed
without the patient's permission."
Although confidentiality is essential to the doctor/patient rela-
tionship, there are legitimate reasons for restricting the scope of
confidentiality." Since general public safety is considered more
important than confidentiality of health records, the protection of
confidentiality ends where the public peril begins." The impor-
tance of public safety not only eliminates confidentiality, but in
certain situations puts an affirmative duty on the treating medical
professional to report the patient's condition to the appropriate
authority.' For example, doctors are required to report any in-
medical data necessary for good health care). Confidentiality may shield the patient against
harm to reputation, employment and personal relationships. Id. at 505.
79. See Winslade, supra note 78, at 503.
80. Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.2d 148, 154, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 586 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1979) (cause of action may be maintained against a doctor who discloses patient's
confidential information without authority); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 210, 400
N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (physician who enters into agreement with
patient impliedly covenants to keep all disclosures in confidence); Felis v. Greenberg, 51
Misc. 2d 441, 443, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966) (physician's fur-
nishing of information to insurance company without patient authority violates confidential
relationship).
81. See Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So.2d 1207, 1213 (Ala. 1983) (child abuse
falls under state reporting statute); Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59
N.Y.2d 130, 135, 450 N.E. 2d 678, 680-81, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760-61 (1983) (subpeona
for confidential information from a hospital quashed); Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399,
413, 551 P.2d 389, 392, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1976) (physician diagnosing battered child
must report it to the appropriate authority); see aLso Winslade, supra note 78, at 503. In
general, medical information is viewed as a rich depository of valuable data by third par-
ties. See Gellman, supra note 75, at 261. The vast number of organizations that use medical
information illustrates its tremendous value. Id. Among the recipients of this information
are: (1) public health agencies for surveillance of diseases; (2) medical and social research-
ers for investigation of disease patterns; (3) employers for employer related health insur-
ance and employment suitability; (4) insurance companies in order to determine risks and
liability; and (5) law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations. Id. at 261-62.
82. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,17 Cal. 3d 425, 446, 551 P.2d 334, 337,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20, (1976) (protective privilege ends where public peril begins); Simon-
sen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (disclosure of information by
physician not betrayal of confidence if made in order to prevent spread of disease); Berry v.
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814, 817-18 (1958) (where life, safety and well-being are
in jeopardy there is a conditional privilege to reveal information); Winslade, supra note 78,
at 515. This threshold is discretionary in nature and must be made by professionals and
public officials who have made a careful assessment of the facts of the case. Id. at 515. See
POZGAR, LEGAL AsP.wrs oF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 17 (2d ed. 1983).
83. See Damme, supra note 42, at 806-07. For example, New York requires the report-
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stances of gunshot wounds or child abuse even though under
other circumstances this information would be confidential." Leg-
islatures have acknowledged that the public welfare does super-
sede the individual's right to confidentiality with the implementa-
tion of reporting statutes." The objectives of a reporting statute
are to protect the health of the public through identification of
infected persons and to gather epidemiological data in order to
identify the severity of the epidemic." This information is then
used to justify escalation of more restrictive control measures. 7
Any successful treatment of the AIDS epidemic relies on the
identification of those infected and it is imperative that treating
physicians make this information available to local health agen-
cies, so they may then take appropriate measures."
V. CONCLUSION
The AIDS crisis is probably the greatest health emergency to
confront our nation in this half of the century. At this time there
is no known cure for this deadly disease, and the medical commu-
nity is still inconclusive as to its modes of transmission. Although
all are guaranteed personal liberties in our Constitution, these lib-
erties must sometimes be infringed upon in the face of a serious
health emergency such as the AIDS crisis. Accordingly, under the
guise of the state's compelling interest to insure the public health,
the proposed quarantine and exclusion of known AIDS victims
from schools would be constitutionally valid and proper. In addi-
tion, it is imperative that the confidential relationship between the
doctor and patient be infringed upon to ensure prompt reporting
of known AIDS victims, so that its escalation can be controlled.
Geoffrey R. Mazel
ing of actual or suspected cases of communicable diseases. See N.Y. PuB. HFALTm LAW §
2101 (Consol. 1976).
84. See supra note 81, and accompanying text.
85. Damme, supra note 42, at 806-07.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Cf supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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